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APPENDIXES
I
THE CASE OF THE U. S. S. "PANAY," DECEMBER 12, 1937
[Press Releases, Vol. 17, Nos. 429 and 430]

The Secretary of State last night (Dec. 12, 1937) sent
a preliminary instruction to the American Ambassador to
Japan, Mr. Joseph C. Grew. The preliminary instruction
read as follows :
"Telegrams from Hankow indicate that yesterday and
today American and British naval and merchant vessels
at various points on Yangtze above Nanking were repeatedly fired on and bombed. A Japanese source is reported
to have stated at Wuhu that Japanese military forces have
orders to fire on all ships on the Yangtze. Today the
U. S. S. Panay and three Standard Oil steamers at point
twenty-seven miles above Nanking .are reported bombed
and sunk and survivors-including Embassy personnel,
Navy personnel and so1ne refugees-are now at Hohsien.
Please immediately inform Foreign Minister Hirota, ask
for information, and request that Japanese Govern1nent
immediately take appropriate action. Impress upon him
the gravity of the situation and the imperative need to take
every precaution against further attacks on American
vessels or personnel.
"vVhen we have further particulars I shall g1ve you
further instruction."Ambassador Joseph C. Grew today reported to the Secretary of State from Tokyo, as follows:
"The ~1inister for Foreign Affairs has just called on me in
person at the Chancery and has informed n1e of the receipt
of a Domei report from Shanghai that in following fleeing
remnants of the Chinese army Japanese planes had bombed
three Standard Oil vessels and had sunk the U. S. S. Panay
129
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while in the close vicinity on the Yangtze above Nanking..
The l\finister said that he had as yet received no official
report but that he had come immediately to express to ourGovernment the profound apology of the Japanese Government and that Ambassador Saito would do the same to you.
He said that Admiral Hasegawa had accepted full responsibility for the accident. He said that immediately after my
visit this morning he had communicated my representations.
to the Japanese naval and military authorities. Hirota said
'I cannot possibly express how badly we feel about this.,.
The Navy and War l\-finisters have sent similar expressions:
of regret to the Navy and War Departments in Washington
through the Naval and Military Attaches here."
When the Secretary of State saw the President today just
prior to his meeting with the Japanese Ambassador, at the·
Department of State, the President gave Secretary Hull the
following memorandum:
"THE WHITE HousE, Washington.
"MEl\IORANDUl\I HANDED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AT
P. 1\f., DECEl\IBER

12 : 30

13, 1937

"Please tell the Japanese Ambassador when you see him
at one o'clock :
"1. That the President is deeply shocked and concerned
by the news of indiscriminate bombing of American and
other non-Chinese vessels on the Yangtze, and that he requests that the Emperor be so advised.
"2. That all the facts are being assembled and will shortly
be presented to the Japanese Government.
"3. That in the meantime it is hoped the Japanese Government will be considering definitely for presentation to
this Government:
''a. Full expressions of regret and proffer of full compensation:
"b. l\fethods guaranteeing against a repetition of any
similar attack in the futul'e.

"F. D. R."
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Secretary Hull informed Ambassador Saito of this instruction from the White House at 1 o'clock, December 13, 1937.
The Japanese Ambassador called upon the Secretary of
State at 1 o'clock this afternoon. He informed the Secretary
that the Fo.r eign Minister of Japan, before receiving official
reports concerning the bombing and sinking of the U. S. S.
Panay, called upon Ambassador Grew in Tokyo and offered
regrets.
The Japanese Foreign Minister had instructed Ambassador Saito that reports were to be given to the Secretary of
State. The Ambassador was also instructed to extend full
regrets and apologies which he came to the Secretary to do.
The Ambassador added that the American authorities had
informed the Japanese authorities of the position of the
American vessels and that therefore the bombing was a very
grave blunder.
The Ambassador said further that the Japanese authorities were trying to furnish relief to the survivors at
Hohsien, but that the place is one where Chinese and Japanese troops are fighting and that it was a difficult matter to
get relief to them.
The Secretary of State last night instructed the American
Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Joseph C. Grew, to communicate to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan ;the
following note :
"The Government and people of the United States have
been deeply shocked by the facts of the bombardment and
sinking of the U. S. S. Panay and the sinking or burning
of the American steamers Meiping, Meian and Meisian by
Japanese aircraft.
"The essential facts are that these American vessels were
in the Yangtze River by uncontested and incontestable right;
that they were flying the American flag; that they were
engaged in their legitimate and appropriate business; that
they were at the moment conveying American official and
private personnel away from points where danger had developed; that they had several times changed their position,
moving upriver, in order to avoid danger; and that they
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were attacked by Japanese bon1bing planes. With regard
to the attack, a responsible Japanese naval officer at
Shanghai . has inforn1ed the Con1mander-in-Chief of the
A1nerican Asiatic Fleet that the four vessels were proceeding upriver; that a Japanese plane endeavored to ascertain
their nationality, flying at an altitude of three hundred
meters, but was unable to distinguish the flags; that three
Japanese bon1bing planes, six Japanese fighting planes, six
Japanese bombing planes, and two Japanese bombing planes,
in sequence, 1nade attacks which resulted in the damaging of
one of the American stea1ners, and the sinking of the U. S. S.
Panay and the other t""o stea1ners.
"Since the beginning of the pres~nt unfortunate hostilities
between Japan and China, the Japanese Government and
various Japanese authorities at various point~ have repeatedly assured the Govern1nent and authorities of the
United States that it is the intention and purpose of the
Japanese Government and the Japanese ar1ned forces to
respect fully the rights and interests of other powers. On
several occasions, howeYer, acts of Japanese armed forces
have violated the rights of the United States, have seriously
endangered the lives of American nationals, and have
destroyed American property. In several instances, the
Japanese Government has admitted the facts, has expressed
regrets, and has given assurance that every precaution will
be taken against recurrence of such incidents. In the present
case, acts of Japanese armed forces have taken place in
complete disregard of American rights, have taken American life, and have destroyed American property both public
and private.
"In these circumstances, the Government of the United
States requests and expects of the Japanese Government a
formally recorded expression of regret, an undertaking to
make complete and comprehensive indemnifications; and an
assurance that definite and specific steps have been taken
which will ensure that hereafter American nationals, interests and property in China will not be subjected to attack
by Japanese armed forces or unlawful interference by any
Japanese authorities or forces ""hatsoever."
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Following is the text of a note handed to the American
Ambassador to Japan, ~1r. Joseph C. Grew, by the Japanese
Minister for Foreign Affairs on December 24, 1937:
"DECEl\IBER 24, 1937.
"MoNsiEUR L'Al\IBASSADEUR,
"Regarding the unfortunate incident occurring on the
Yangtze River about twenty-six miles above Nanking on
the 12th instant, in which Japanese naval aircraft attacked
by mistake the U. S. S. Panay and three merchant ships belonging to the Standard Oil Company of America, causing
them to sink or burn with the result that there 'vere caused
casualties among those on board, I had the honor previously
to send to Your Excellency my note dated the fourteenth
of December. Almost simultaneously, however, I received
Your Excellency's note No. 838, which was sent by the direction of the Government of the United States, and which,
after describing the circumstance~ prior to the occurrence of
the incident, concludes that the acts of the Japanese forces
in the attack were carried out in complete disregard of the
rights of the United States, taking American life and destroying American property, both public and private; and
'vhich states that, 'in these circumstances, the Government
of the United States requests and expects of the Japanese
Government a formally recorded expression of regret, and
an undertaking to make complete and comprehensive indemnifications, and an assurance that definite and specific
steps have been taken which will ensure that hereafter
American nationals, interests, and property in China will
not be subjected to attack by Japanese armed forces or
unlawful interference by any Japanese authorities or forces
'vhatsoever.'
"As regards the circumstances surrounding the present
unfortunate incident, I desire to state that while it is concluded in Your Excellency's note that the incident resulted
from disregard of American rights by Japanese armed
forces, it was entirely due to a mistake, as has been described
in my note above-mentioned. As a result of the thorough
investigations which have been continued since then in all
possible ways to find out the real causes, it has now been
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fully established that the attack was entirely unintentionaL
I trust that this has been made quite -clear to Your Excellency through the detailed explanations Inade to Your Excellency on the 23rd instant by our naval and military
authorities.
"1Vith reference to the first two iten1s of the requests mentioned in Your Excellency's note, na1nely, a recorded expression of regret, and indemnifications, no word needs to be
added to what I have said in my afore-mentioned note. As
regards the guarantee for the future, I wish to inform Your
Excellency that the Japanese Navy issued without delay
strict orders to 'exercise the greatest caution in every area
where warships and other vessels of An1erica or any other
third power are present, in order to a void a recurrence of a
similar mistake, even at the sacrifice of a strategic advantage
in attacking the Chinese troops.' Furthermore, rigid orders have been issued to the l\1ilitary, Naval, and Foreign
Office authorities to pay, in the light of the present unto,vard
incident, greater attention than hitherto to observance of
the instructions that have been repeatedly given against infringement of, or unwarranted interference with, the rights
and interests of the United States and other third powers.
And the Japanese Government are studying carefully every
possible means of achieving more effectively the abovestated aims, while they have already taken steps to ascertain,
in still closer contact with American authorities in China,
the whereabouts of American interests and nationals, and to
improve the means of communicating intelligence thereof
speedily and effectively to the authorities on the spot.
"Although thP- attack on the man-of-,var and other vessels
of the United States was due to a mistake as has been stated
above, the Commander of the flying force concerned was
immediately removed from his post, and recalled, on the
grounds of a failure to take the fullest measures of precaution. l\foreover, the staff members of the fleet and the commander of the flying squadron and all others responsible
have been duly dealt with according to law. The Japanese
Government are thus endeavoring to preclude absolutely all
possibility of the recurrence of incidents of a similar character. It needs hardly be emphasized that, of all the abovementioned measures taken by the Japanese Government, the
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Tecall of the commander of the flying force has a significance
.of special importance. It is my fervent hope that the fact
will be fully appreciated by the Government of the United
.States that this drastic step has been taken solely because
-of the sincere desire of the Japanese Government to safe.guard the rights and interests of the United States and other
third powers.
"I a vail [etc.].
"KOKI HIROTA."

The Secretary of State today instructed the American
.Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Joseph C. Grew, to communicate
the following note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs:
"The Government of the United States refers to its note
·of December 14, the Japanese Government's note of December 14 and the Japanese Government's note of December 24
in regard to the attack by Japanese armed forces upon the
U. S. S. Prunay and three American merchant ships.
"In this Government's note of December 14 it was stated
that 'the Government of the United States requests and expects of the Japanese Government a formally recorded expression of regret, an undertaking to make complete and
·comprehensive indemnifications; and an assurance that
definite and specific steps have been taken which will ensure
·that hereafter American nationals, interests and property in
·China will not be subjected to attack by Japanese armed
-forces or unlawful interference by any Japanese authorities
·-or forces whatsoever.'
"In regard to the first two items of the request made by
the Government of the United States, the Japanese Gov·ernment's note of December 24 reaffirms statements made
in the Japanese Government's note of December 14 which
read 'the Japanese Government regret most profoundly that
·"it (the present incident) has caused damages to the United
·States' man-of-war and ships and casualties among those
on board, and desire to present hereby sincere apologies.
'The Japanese Government will make indemnifications for
all the losses and will deal appropriately with those respon·sible for the incident.' In regard to the third item of the
:request made by the Government of the United States, the
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Japanese Government's note of December 24 recites certain
definite and specific steps which the Japanese Government
has taken to ensure, in words of that note, 'against infringement of, or unwarranted interference with, the rights and
interests of the United States and other third powers' and
states that 'The Japanese Government are thus endeavoring
to preclude absolutely all possibility of the recurrence of
incidents of a siinilar character.'
"The Governn1ent of the United States observed with
satisfaction the pron1ptness with which the Japanese Governn1ent in its note of December 14 adn1itted responsibility,
expressed regret, and offered a1nends.
"The Governn1ent of the United States regards the J apanese Govern1nent's account, as set forth in the Japanese
Government's note of Dece1nber 24, of action taken by it
as responsive to the request made by the Governn1ent of
the United States in this Governmenfs note of Dece1nber 14.
"'Vith regard to the facts of the origins, causes and circun1stances of the incident, the Japanese Govenunent indicates in its note of December 24 the conclusion at which
the Japanese Govern1nent, as a result of its investigation,
has arrived. With regard to these same matters, the Governinent of the United States relies on the report of findings
of the Court of Inquiry of the United States Navy, a copy
of which has been communicated officially to the Japanese
Gover1m1ent.
"It is the earnest hope of the Governn1ent of the United
States that the steps which the Japanese Govern1nent has
taken will prove effective toward preventing any further
attacks upon or unlawful interference by Japanese authorities or forces with American nationals, interests or property
in China."
Following is a report received by the Secretary of the
Navy fro1n the co1nmanding officer of the U. S. S. Panay,
Lt. Co1ndr ..J. J. Hughes, United States Xavy:
"On Suncla~y, Dece1nber 12, 1937, the U. S. S. Panay was
operating under the orders of the con11nander, Yangtze
patrol, and at that time "~as anchored about 15 1niles above
X anking acting as a refuge for A1nerican citizens and men1-
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bers of the A1nerican Embassy. The ship was accompanied
by the American merchant ships Meiping, Meishia, Meian,
and miscellaneous launches and junks. The latest orders
fro1n the commander of the Yangtze patrol to the comInanding officer had been received the day before by despatch
, and said the commanding officer was to have complete discretion in moving the ship up or down the river.
"The ship "ras identified as an American vessel by two
large horizontal flags, one spread over the for,vard top
deck and one over the after top deck, both clearly visible
from the air at any angle. Each of these flags 1neasured
about 18 feet in length and about 14 feet in width and had
been freshly repainted. In addition to these t'-vo flags and
on account of the emergency condition existing, the Panay
had been flying her largest size ensign at the gaff both
day and night whether underway or at anchor. All ensigns
both horizontal and vertical ''ere brightly ilhuninated all
night.
"At 8: 14 a. m., I observed artillery shells falling in the
river about 400 yards off our starboard beam presun1ably
:fro1n Japanese artillery although the batteries were not
visible. At 8: 25 a. m., I got the Panay underw·ay for upriYer to get clear of this firing and signalled the convoy to
follow at 8: 43 a. m.
"At 9:40 a. 111. having resumed our journey ''ith the
Panay at the head of the cohunn, followed in the order
nan1ed by the M eiping, illeishia, and Llfeian, t"~o groups of
Japanese soldiers were sighted on the left (north) bank.
They 'vaYed hand flags at the Panay and see1ned to ''ant
to communicate ''ith us. Accordingly the Panay hove to
and a Japanese armed tender ca1ne alongside carrying Lt.
Sheseyo l\furakami and about 90 men, most of ''ho1n ""ere
ar1ned with machine guns. Lieutenant Anders, rny executive officer, met this officer at the gang,Yay as he stepped
on board accompanied by his s'vord bearer and t"~o privates with fixed bayonets. Lieutenant Anders informed 1ne
that the officer desired to speak to 1ne so I turned the conn
over to Lieutenant Anders and went to the gang"~ay.
Lieutenant ~iurakami asked me where the Panay w·as
going and I said to a point upriver 28 1niles fro1n Nanking.
167533---4Q----10
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He said ''Vby are you going there,' to which I replied 'To
keep clear of artillery fire.' He asked me about the three
merchant ships and I informed him that they were American ships under my protection. His next question 'vas
about the Chinese troops holding solidly to 'vhich I said
that the United States was friendly to both Japan and
China and therefore I could not give him any information
about the Chinese Army. This conversation was witnessed
by Second Secretary, l\1r. George Atcheson, Jr., of the
An1erican Embassy, Nanking, China. Lieutenant Murakami then invited me to repay his call ashore, 'vhich invitation I respectfully declined. At 9 : 53 a. m. the Japanese
tender cleared the side.
"At 9: 54 a. m. the Panay again resumed her way up the
river. At 11 a. m. I anchored the Panay at a point 20
miles up river from Nanking and about 221 miles above
vVoosung in a broad open space in the river. My reason
£or anchoring there was simply to keep out of the way of
the contending armies. This location seemed highly desirable. We were easily visible, especially accompanied as we
'vere by three merchant ships, for miles around on every
side. It seemed unlikely that any troops would try to cross
the river in our vicinity. In selecting this spot I had in
mind primarily the safety of the Panay and the refugees
'vhom she 'vas carrying, but also the safety and well-being
of the American ships in the convoy and their personnel.
Immediately upon anchoring I posted sentry lookouts for
airplanes and troop movements. At 1 p. m. I allowed a
party of about eight men to visit the lJ!eiping nearby.
These men were still on board the Meiping when the attack
started and were therefore unable to return to the ship.
"At about 1:27 p. m. the lookout called down that two
planes were in sight, altitude about 4,000 feet. The weather
'vas clear with good visibility and no wind. The planes
'vere clearly visible in spite of their altitude which may not
have been as high as reported to me at that time. I had no
idea whatsoever that the planes intended to attack us.
About this time I went up to the bridge with Chief Quartermaster John Lang in order to keep a better lookout for
further plane approaches. About 1: 29 p. m. I looked out
the door of the bridge to pick up again the two planes I
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had originally seen and was astonished to discover that both
were rapidly losing altitude in a direction toward us. Almost i1nmediately they appeared to go into power dives.
Almost i1nmediately a bomb seemed to strike directly over
Dur heads ripping a big hole in the roof of the bridge. I
lost consciousness for what must have been only a minute or
t'vo ; when I came to I discovered myself on the deck of the
bridge badly stunned with my head covered with blood and
1ny right leg painfully injured at the hip, making it impossible for me to rise to my feet. A hole had also been broken
in the deck of the bridge near where Lang and I had been
standing. I asked Lang if he were injured to 'vhich he
replied 'No, sir.' Not being able to determine the extent of
the damage from the inside of the bridge which was completely wrecked he helped me down to the ship's galley
'vhich is on the main deck, and a good central point from
'vhich to direct operations. Before I was able to reach the
galley, 'vhich was necessarily a slow process on account of
my disabling wound, I heard the Panay's machine guns
firing and realized that the crew was carrying on probably
under the immediate direction of Lieutenant Anders, my
-executive officer. At the galley I sent Lang to notify all
officers that I was in the galley incapacitated and to tell the
.engineer officer, Lieutenant (j. g.) Geist to let me know if
we 'vere taking water and if 've could get the ship
under""'ay.
"From then on the planes bombed us continuously until
:about 2: 25 p. In. They appeared to be attacking us in relays of t""'O or three each. The first group that came over
·d ive-bombed from a considerable altitude which kept them
beyond the range of our Le,vis machine guns. Later when
the Panay was visibly smashed up they came much closer
:and not only let go their bombs from low altitudes of perhaps one or two hundred feet, but also machine-gunned our
·d ecks firing as they came down diving. I distinctly heard
their guns which had a different sound from the Panay's.
I 'vas informed at the time that the planes were Japanese
Navy planes identified by their characteristic red circle.
According to my reckoning the Panay must have received
·about 24 direct hits. I could not believe it was possible for
such a small ship to receive such damage and still float. I
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inforn1ed later that the first bo1nb which disabled me
also put the forward 3-inch gun and the radio room out of
action and brought do,Yn the fore1nast.
"At 1: 58 p. In. the ship appeared to be settling quite :fast;
mean,vhile, before the engineer officer could reach me to
give me a report on the status of our propelling n1achinery,
I heard a sharp rush of steam escaping from our stea1ning
boiler. The engineer officer, Lieutenant Geist, reported
shortly thereafter and said we could not get under,vay because the steaming boiler had been ruptured. About this
time someone informed me that "\Ve appeared to be in danger
of being run down by one of the merchant ships. I got
l\1r. Paxton to carry 1ne to the door of the galley, and from
'vhat I could see I supposed that the vessel was attempting to come alongside the Panay, probably to take off our
personnel. About that instant another storm of bombs :fell
both on the Panay and the merchant ship. The latter then
abandoned her attempt to help the Panay. It should be
remembered that attacking planes concentrated aln1ost all
their efforts on the Panay during at least the first half hour.
"By 2 p. m. it seemed unlikely to me that I should be able
to save the ship. About 2: 02 p. m. Ensign Biwerse returned and said he thought we should abandon ship, especially as he thought the job would take some time with
only t'vo small boats. Accordingly, I gave the order to
abandon ship, and to start by sending the worst wounded
ashore first. Boats contained only wounded except for the
boats' cre,vs, Chief Boatswain's l\1ate l\1ahlmann and several of the cre'v that had not been injured. They came to
the galley to put 1ne in the first boat. I protested against
leaving the ship at this time, and was most unwilling to
do so; but it appeared that they did not heed my protest
because of my condition. vVith l\1r. Paxton's assistance
they carried me down to the deck, and laid me flat on 1ny
face across the bow of the motor sampan.
"I told Ensign Biwerse to tell Lieutenant Anders and the
other officers that if the attack should cease I "~anted Ensign
Bi 'verse to remain on board with a small detail of about
six uninjured men to do "\Yhat they 'vould to keep the ship
from going do,vn and that in any case Ensign Biwerse and
his detail "\vere to be the last to leave. I kne'v at that tin1e
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that Ensign Biwerse was the only uninjured officer although
suffering from shock and had had most of his clothes blown
off and believed that Lieutenant Anders and Lieutenant
(j. g.) Geist were sufficiently injured to justify their leaving
the ship before the last boatload. After arriving on shore
I was informed both the motor sampan and pulling sampan
had been machine-gunned by the attacking planes. Some
time thereafter I heard the sound of a motor launch in the
river close to where we were hidden in the reeds. The
launch stayed in our vicinity a few n1inutes and then left. I
cannot say whether or not they attempted to search for us
because I "\Vas keeping my men out of sight and had deliberately left no debris on the beach by which we could be
traced. Shortly afterwards a second launch passed.
"About this time the planes started bombing the merchant vessels. At 2: 25 p. m. they ceased bombing the
Panay altogether. It was while they were bombing the
Panay that t'vo of the merchant vessels were able to get
underway and beach themselves.
"vVith only t'vo s1nall boats available it took 1nany return
trips to take all the personnel off the ship. Starting at 2: 05
p. m. we completed the operations at a little after 3 p. m.
Son1etime before the ship sank I heard the rattle of machine
guns and was informed that an armed Japanese boat was
firing on the Panay. I 'vas subsequently informed that this
boat had put several men on board 'vho remained only a
few minutes and then left. I was shortly informed that the
ship sank with her colors still flying at 3: 54 p. m. turning
over to starboard.
"'Vhile on board the roar of the bomb explosions and the
pieces of debris flying around made it impossible to keep
any written record of the various hits, the damage sustained,
or the injury to personnel.
"There was absolutely no panic. The orders I gave were
carried out exactly. The ship had the normal Yangtze
gunboat general quarters station bill. 'Ve had special details for air defense which involved using only our machine
guns.
"The hull had many holes "Then abandoned and 'vas shipping water rather rapidly. It would have been i1npossible
to get the ship underway to beach her because her steaming
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boiler had been ruptured. Lieutenant Anders, my execut~ve
officer, with great courage and perseverance maintained the
fire of all our machine guns although he had been badly
wounded almost immediately in the throat, and later in the
arm and both hands. He was able however, to keep his.
feet and maintained active charge.
"As already mentioned, I had my men abandon ship in
the order of the worst wounded. First, I sent the boats to·
the nearest land which was covered by high reeds. I told
the men that after they reached the beach they were to get
in shore and hide in the reeds without, however, getting too·
far separated. After getting all the men off the ship and
on the beach we found two Japanese planes flying fairly
low overhead apparently looking for the Panay survivors.
The reeds, however, apparently afforded us sufficient cover
to remain unseen. These planes subsequently departed but
shortly later bombing attacks were made on the two merchant vessels which were by now beached on the bank opposite us. The third merchant vessel had already been sunk
by bombs.
"We were on an island. Lt. Arthur F. Anders, my executive officer, was by this time badly weakened from loss of
blood and Lieutenant (j. g.) Geist was also badly wounded
in the leg. Ensign Biwerse had escaped actual injury but
was suffering somewhat from shock. I felt that under thecircumstances of our urgent condition and position that I
should utilize the experience and mature judgment of Capt.
Frank N. Roberts, United States Army, the Assistant Military Attache to the American Embassy in China, who had·
co1ne on board at Nanking. He had escaped injury and
was most anxious as an officer to assist me in any way. Hi&
ability to speak Chinese was also a valuable factor. I therefore appointed him as my immediate representative to take
active physical charge under my direction and such orders.
as he gave were after consultation with me and by my authority and direction. I also acknowledge gratefully the·
kind and efficient assistance of Mr. Atcheson in the same
way. It is my grateful duty to add that Captain Roberts'·
services were absolutely invaluable and it is impossible for
me to express my full appreciation of them. I am sure that
every member of the party would agree that his efficiency,.
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kindness, and tact, and his experience in handling an operation of this nature on shore greatly contributed to our final
escape. Mr. Atcheson, who also speaks Chinese, agreed at
1ny request to remain with the party to facilitate dealings
with Chinese officials.
"At about 5: 15 p. m. Second Secretary of the Embassy
Mr. J. Hall Paxton, who also speaks Chinese, left our party
at my request to try to get a message through either by
telephone or telegraph to the American Ambassador at Hanko'v, infor1ning him of our plight.
"As already mentioned, after dark all able-bodied men
tracked the launch carrying the wounded around the little
island close to the mainland on which we had found ourselves. In the meantime Mr. Paxton who had gone on
ahead sent back coolie carriers from the first village and
they carried our wounded there. At this village we engaged more coolies and set out for the next village inland,.
Hohsien, which was 5 miles a'vay and 3 miles away from
the river bank. 'Vhen we arrived at Hohsien about midnight we 'vere received and treated with the greatest kindness by the magistrate and all the Chinese there and were
quartered in the hospital where we remained throughout
the daylight. On Monday, 13 December, Ensminger, storekeeper 1st class, and Mr. Sandro Sandri, Italian journalist,
died from their injuries while we were there.
"At dark that evening, 13 December, we set out for the
next town, Hanshan, by junks 'vhich Captain Roberts had
engaged. It was while 've 'vere at Hanshan, approximately
12 miles inland from the left (north) bank, that I received
""'ord of the American and British gunboats which had been
sent to assist us and of the presence of a Japanese gunboat
to guarantee us safety from further attacks. The magistrate and the Chinese residents of the second village were
just as helpful as those of the first. Finding the party and
rendering medical aid, they were willing to have us in spite
of the fact that they thought as we did that our presence
among them would draw down bombing attacks from the
Japanese planes.
"1Ve left Hanshan about noon on 14 December in the same
junks in which we had arrived and reached the Yangtze
river about 9: 45 p. m. that night. The entire party was on
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board the U. S. S. Oahu and H. ~L S. Ladybird by 1 a. m.
Dece1nber 15. All the passengers who were on board the
Panay 'vere there at their own request.
"I have no complaint to make regarding the conduct of
any officer or enlisted 1nan or any passenger. In my opinion everyone acted with fine courage and initiative. I consider that the action of my officers and crew in attempting
to return the fire, rendering first aid, safely evacuating all
personnel, transporting the "rounded, keeping together and
returning as one party 'vith the dead and wounded is sufficient evidence of their courage, discipline, and fortitude.
I keenly regret that my ov•.rn injury preYented me from observing individual acts of courageous conduct of which I
feel certain, under the circumstances, eYery officer and n1an
performed both while on board ship and during the subsequent traveling ashore. I was particularly impressed by
and grateful for the high morale and cheerful and faithful
manner in 'vhich my officers and men assisted one another.
I deem it my duty however to ·comment particularly upon
the cool and courageous conduct of Lt. Arthur F. Anders,
my executive officer, who though wounded in several places,
unable to speak and suffering severe loss of blood, kept his
feet, directed the fire and supervised the abandon ship. His
conduct was an inspiration to all hands. I also consider
that Lt. Clark G. Grazier, l\1edical Corps, United States
Navy, our only doctor, who 'vas fortunately not 'vounded,
displayed coolness, ability and resourcefulness with his treatn1ent of the many 'vounded both 'vhile under fire aboard
ship and under very difficult conditions ashore. His untiring efforts and professional skill undoubtedly contributed
greatly to reduce the seriousness of the injuries."
Following is the text of the report of findings of the
Court of Inquiry ordered to investigate the bombing and
sinking of the U. S. S. Panay. The Secretary of the Navy
announced that these findings have been approved , by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet:
"The Court finds as follo,vs: 1. That on December 12,
1937, the U. S. S. Panay, a unit of the Yangtze patrol of the
United States Asiatic Fleet, "~as operating under la,vful
orders on the Yangtze River.
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"2. That the immediate mission of the U. S. S. Panay
'vas to protect nationals, maintain communication between
the United States Embassy, Nanking, and office of the Ambassador at Hankow, provide a temporary office for the
United States Embassy staff during the time when Nanking
was greatly endangered by 1nilitary operations, and to afford
a refuge for American and other foreign nationals.
"3. That due to intensive shell fire around Nanking the
U. S. S. Panay had changed berth several times to avoid
being hit, and on the morning of December 12, 1937, formed
a convoy of Socony Vacuum Oil Co. vessels principally the
S. S. Meiping, Meishia and Meian and proceeded up river.
"4. That adequate steps were taken at all times to assure
that the Japanese authorities were informed of the movements of the U. S. S. Panay.
"5. That in addition to her regular complement the U. S.
S. Panay had on board at this time four members of the
American Embassy staff, four American nationals and five
foreign nationals.
"6. That at 9: 40 a. m. while standing upriver the U. S. S.
Panay stopped in response to a signal from a Japanese
landing boat, a Japanese Army boarding officer with guard
went on board and was informed that the U. S. S. Panay
and convoy were proceeding to anchorage 28 miles above
Nanking, no 'varning 'vas given of any danger likely to be
encountered.
"7. That at about 11 a.m., December 12, 1937, the U.S. S.
Panay and convoy anchored in the Yangtze River in a compact group at about mileage 221 above Woosung, 28 miles
above Nanking.
"8. That the U. S. S. Panay was painted white with buff
upper works and stacks and displayed t'vo large horizontal
flags on her upper deck awnings plus large colors at her
gaff.
"9. That the Socony Vacuum ships JJ!eiping, JJ!eishia and
M eian each displayed numerous horizontal and vertical
American flags all of large size.
"10. That at 1: 30 the cre'v of the U. S. S. Panay were
engaged in normal Sunday routine and 'vere all on board
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except a visiting party of eight men on board the S. S.
Meiping.

"11. That at about 1: 38 p. m. three large Japanese twinmotored planes in a vee :formation were observed at a considerable height passing overhead down river, at this time
no other craft were in the near vicinity of the Panay and
convoy and there 'vas no reason to believe the ships were in
a dangerous area.
"12. That 'vithout warning these three Japanese planes
released several bombs one or two of which struck on or
very close to the bow of the U. S. S. Panay and another
which struck on or very close to the S. S. M eiping.
"13. That the bombs of the first attack did considerable
damage to the U. S. S. Panay disabling the :forward 3-inch
gun, seriously injuring the captain and others, wrecking
the pilot house and sick bay, disabling the radio equipment,
and the steaming fireroom so that all power was lost and
causing leaks in the hull, which resulted in the ship settling
down by the head and listing to· starboard, thereby contributing :fundamentally to the sinking of the ship.
"14. That immediately thereafter a group of six singleengined planes attacked :from ahead diving singly and appearing to concentrate on the U. S. S. Panay. A total of
about 20 bombs were dropped, many striking close aboard
and creating by :fragments and concussions great damage to
the ship and personnel. · These attacks lasted about 20 minutes during which time at least two of the planes attacked
also 'vith machine guns, one machine-gun attack was directed against a ship's boat bearing wounded ashore causing
several :further wounds and piercing the boat with bullets.
"15. That during the entire attack the weather was clear
'vith high visibility and little if any wind.
"16. 'fhat the planes participating in the attacks on the
U. S. S. Panay and its convoy were unmistakingly identified
by their markings as being Japanese.
"17. That immediately after the first bomb struck, airdefense stations were manned and the 30-caliber machinegun battery opened fire and engaged the attacking planes
throughout the re1nainder of the attack. The 3-inch battery
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was not manned nor were any 3-inch shells fired at any time,
this was in accordance with the ship's air-defense bill.
"18. That during the bombing many were injured by flying fragments and concussion and all suffered shock on the
·first bomb. The Captain suffered a broken hip and severe
·shock, soon thereafter Lieutenant Anders, executive officer,
\vas wounded by fragments in throat and hands losing
power of speech, Lieutenant, Junior Grade, Geist, engineer
·officer, received fragn1ents in the legs, Ensign Biwerse had
~lathing blown off and was severely shocked, this included
all the line officers of the ship, the Captain being disabled,
the executive officer carried on his duties giving orders in
·writing. He issued instructions to get under,vay and to
beach the ship. Extensive damage prevented getting
underway.
"19. That at about 2 p. m., believing it impossible to save
the ship and considering the number of wounded and the
length of time necessary to transfer them ashore in two
-small boats, the Captain ordered the ship to be abandoned,
this was completed by about 3 p. m. By this time the main
·deck was awash and the Panay appeared to be sinking.
"20. All severely wounded were transferred ashore in the
first trips, the Captain protested in his own case. The ex~cutive officer when no longer able to carry on due to wounds
left the ship on the next to last trip and Ensign Biwerse
remained until the last trip.
"21. That after the Panay had been abandoned, Mahlmann, chief boatswain's mate and Weimers, machinist's
mate first class, returned to the Panay in one of the ship's
boats to obtain stores and medical supplies. While they
were returning to the beach a Japanese power boat filled
with armed Japanese soldiers approached close to the Panay,
opened fire with a machine gun, went alongside, boarded and
left within 5 minutes.
"22. That at 3: 54 p. m. the Panay, shortly after the J apanese boarding party had left, rolled over to the starboard
and sank in from 7 to 10 fathoms of water, approximate
latitud~ 30°44'30" north, longitude 117°27' east. Practically no valuable Government property was salvaged.
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"23. That after the Panay survivors had reached the left
bank of the river the Captain, in vie"~ of his own injuries
and the injuries and shock sustained by his re1naining line
officers and the general feeling that attempts "~ould be made
to exterminate the survivors, requested Capt. F. X. Roberts,
United States Army, who was not injured and "~ho ''as
familiar with land operations and the Chinese language, to
act under his directions as his immediate representative.
Captain Roberts functioned in this capacity until the return
of the Panay survivors on board the U. S. S. Oahu on
December 15, 1937, performing outstanding service.
"24. That niessrs. Atcheson and Paxton of the United
States Embassy staff rendered highly valuable services on
shore ''here their know ledge of the country and language,
coupled with their resourcefulness and sound advice, contributed largely to the safety of the party.
"25. That after some 50 hours ashore, during which time
the entire party suffered much hardship and exposure somewhat mitigated by the kindly assistance of the Chinese, they
returned and boarded the U. S. S. Oah?.t and H. l\1. S. Lady-

bird.
"26. That from the beginning of an unprecedented and
unlooked for attack of great violence until their final return,
the ship's company and passengers of the U. S. S. Panay
'vere subjected to grave. danger and continuous hardship,
their action under these conditions was in keeping with the
best traditions of the naval service.
"27. That an1ong the Panay passengers, l\Ir. Sandro
Sandri died of his injuries at 1: 30, December 13, l\Iessrs.
J. Hall Paxton, Emile Gassie and Roy Squires were
wounded.
"28. That early in the bombing attacks the Standard Oil
vessels got under way. illeiping and JJ/eishia secured to a
pontoon at the Kiayuan wharf, the M eian was disabled and
beached further down river on the left bank. All these
ships received injuries during the first phases of the bombing. Serious fires on the 111eiping were extinguished by the
Panay visiting party of eight men w·ho ''ere unable to
return to their ship.
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"29. That after attacks on the Panay had ceased the
JJ!eiping and Jf eishia were further attacked by Japanese
bombing planes, set on fire and destroyed. Just previous to
this bombing Japanese Army units on shore near the 'vharf
attempted to avert this bombing by waving Japanese flags.
They were not successful and received several casualties.
It is kno,vn that Captain Carlson of the JJ! eian 'vas killed
and that Messrs. Marshall, Vines, and Pickering, and Squires
were "\Vounded. Casualties among the Chinese crews of these
vessels were numerous but cannot be fully determined.
"30. That the following members of the Panay ,crew
landed on shore from the M eiping after vainly attempting
to extinguish oil and gasoline fires on board : V. F. Puckett,
chief machinist's n1ate, J. A. Granes, gunner's Inate first
class, J. A. Dirnhoffer, sean1an first class, T. A. Coleinan,
chief phannacist's mate, J. A. Bonkowski, gunner's mate
third class, R. L. Bor,ving, electrician's mate third class,
J. L. Hedge, firen1an first class, and \¥. T. Hoyle, machinist's mate second class. These men encountered Japanese
soldiers on shore 'v ho 'vere not hostile on learning they were
A1nericans.
"31. That all of the Panay crew from the JJ!eiping, except
J. L. Hodge, fireman first class, remained in one group
ashore until the following day when they 'vere rescued by
H. ~1. S. Bee. Hodge made his way to Wuhu and returned
Shanghai via Japanese naval plane on December 14.
"32. That in the searching for and rescuing the survivors,
Rear Admiral Holt, Royal Navy, and the officers and men
of H.l\1. S. Bee and H. M. S. Ladybird rendered most valuable assistance under trying and difficult conditions, thereby
showing a fine spirit of helpfulness and cooperation.
"33. That Charles L. Ensminger, ship's cook first class,
died at 1 : 30 p. m., December 13, at Hohsien, China, from
wounds received during the bombing of the U. S. S. Panay
and that his death occurred in line of duty.
"34. That Edgar C. Hulsebus, coxswain, died at 6: 30 a.m.,
December 19, at Shanghai, China, from wounds received
during the bombing of the U. S. S. Panay and that his death
occurred in line of duty.
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"35. That Lt. Comdr. James J. Hughes, Lt. Arthur F.
Anders, Lt. (Jr. Gr.) John W. Geist, John H. Lang, chief
quartermaster, Robert R. Hebard, fireman first class, l(enneth J. Rice, electrician's mate third class, Carl H.~ Birk,
electrician's mate first class, Charles S. Schroyer, seaman
first class, Alex Kozak, machinist's mate second class, Peres
D. Zeigler, ship's cook third class, and Newton L. Davis,
fireman first class, were seriously injured in line of duty.
"36. That Lt. Clark G. Grazier, Medical Corps, Ensign
Denis H. Biwerse, Charles S. Adams, radioman second class,
Tony Barba, ship's cook third class, John A. Bonkowski,
gunner's mate third class, Ernest C. Branch, fireman first
class, Raymond L. Browning, electrician's mate third class,
Walter Cheatham, coxs\vain, Thomas A. Coleman, chief
pharmacist's mate, John A. Dirnhoffer, seaman first class,
Yuan T. Erh, 1ness attendant first class, Fred G. Fichtenmayer, carpenter's mate first class, Emery F. Fisher, chief
'vatertender, Michael Gerent, machinist's mate second class,
Cecil B. Green, seaman first class, John L. Hodge, fireman
first class, Fon B. Hoffman, watertender second class, l(arl
H. Johnson, machinist's mate second class, Carl H. l(erske,
coxswain, Peter H. Klumpers, chief machinist's mate, William P. Lander, seaman first class, Ernest R. Mahlmann,
chief boatswain's mate, William A. McCabe, fireman first
class, Stanley W. McE~wen, seaman first class, James H.
Peck, quartermaster second class, Reginald Peterson, radioman second class, Vernon F. Puckett, chief machinist's mate,
King F. Sung, mess attendant first class, Harry B. Tuck,
seaman first class, Cleo E. Waxler, boatswain's mate second
class, John T. Weber, yeoman first class, and Far Z. Wong,
mess attendant first class, were slightly injured in line
of duty.
"The Court of Inquiry was con1posed of: Capt. H. V.
1\fcKittrick, United States Navy; Comdr. M. L. Deyo, United
States Navy; Lt. Comdr. A. C. J. Sabalot, United States
Navy, and Lt. C. J. Whiting, United States Navy, Judge

Advocate."

